Major Court Decisions of 1995 by CommLaw Conspectus
MAJOR COURT DECISIONS OF 1995
The following is a compendium of major communi-
cations law decisions handed down by courts of the
United States in 1995.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES
Achernar Broadcasting Company v. FCC
62 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC decision denying two applica-
tions for construction permits for a new ultrahigh
frequency ("UHF") television station because inter-
ference by either applicant would preclude simulta-
neous use of the channel for radio astronomical ob-
servations in an FCC established Quiet Zone was
arbitrary and capricious.
Holding:
The FCC decision denying both applications was
arbitrary and capricious.
Discussion:
The FCC established a Quiet Zone surrounding
the National Radio Astronomy Observatory
("NRAO") to protect NRAO's astronomy telescopes,
which are extremely sensitive to radio signals. One
applicant, Achernar, argued that the FCC's denial
was contrary to the purpose of the Quiet Zone rule
because the rule was established to protect NRAO's
observations, not to impede other broadcasters who
would not interfere with NRAO. The court agreed.
The FCC's failure to consider shared use of the
channel as an option was held arbitrary and capri-
cious and contrary to the agency's goals. (The FCC
did not consider the public interest aspect of the
application.)
Although the other applicant, Lindsay, proposed a
site outside of the Quite Zone, the FCC denied its
application, applying the same standard as if Lind-
say was applying for a site within the zone. This
appears to be a new policy of the FCC with no
explanation.
Both stations argued that the FCC decisions effec-
tively foreclose any station from using Channel 64
because any interference will be deemed unaccept-
able. The court also held that the FCC could not
change the terms of the Quiet Zone rule in the con-
text of a license proceeding and that it had not
formed its own judgment but rather substituted that
of the NRAO.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peha
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
Issue:
Whether the Federal Government, pursuant to
Acts of Congress, may enact policies which require
or offer race-based incentive programs.
Holding:
All racial classifications, whether created at the
federal, state, or local government level, must be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny and thus be narrowly
tailored to further compelling governmental interests.
Discussion:
Adarand Constructors arose to the Supreme Court
from the labyrinthine world of federal government
contracts, a rather "complex scheme of federal stat-
utes and regulations," where programs utilizing
race-based criteria are utilized to further the objec-
tives of Congress to remedy past discrimination.
Specifically, under a U.S. Department of Trans-
portation program, prime contractors of highway
construction projects receive additional compensation
if they award subcontracts to small businesses owned
and controlled by "socially and economically disad-
vantaged individuals." Pursuant to the Small Busi-
ness Act, 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15 U.S.C.§ 631
et. seq., there is a presumption that socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals include Black,
Hispanic, Asian Pacific, and Native Americans, as
well as other minorities, or any individual found to
be disadvantaged under the Act.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. is a Colorado-based
highway construction company owned by a white
male. Despite submitting the low bid on the guard-
rail portion of a government highway contract,
Adarand lost its bid to Gonzales Construction Coin-
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pany due to the fact that Gonzales, and not
Adarand, was certified under the Small Business Act
as a small business controlled by "socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals." This classifi-
cation encouraged the prime contractor to hire Gon-
zales in order to benefit from financial incentives in
the form of additional compensation. Adarand Con-
structors claimed that this policy was a violation by
the Federal Government under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that all racial classifica-
tions, whether created at the federal, state, or local
government level, must be reviewed under strict
scrutiny and thus be narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests. Adarand explic-
itly rejected the standard of review in Metro Broad-
casting Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which
adopted intermediate scrutiny to affirm a benign ra-
cial classification.
Furthermore, the Court signalled that the only
compelling governmental interest that could sustain
strict scrutiny was an interest to remedy past dis-
crimination. Justice O'Connor's opinion did not out-
law affirmative action. The Court recognized that af-
firmative action programs may be necessary for the
government to act in response to the practice and lin-
gering effects of racial discrimination. Only Justices
Thomas and Scalia approached a total ban on af-
firmative action programs and argued that racial en-
titlement reinforces inferior racial stereotypes, cre-
ates resentment, and has a destructive impact the
same as invidious discrimination.
Dissenting Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
wrote separately to, inter alia, reiterate the differ-
ence between race-based programs designed to re-
dress past discrimination and those that serve to per-
petuate invidious discrimination against a race or
ethnic group. Programs that are designed to assist or
benefit minorities are classified as benign and should
be held to a lower level of scrutiny. The dissent also
asserts that the judiciary owes a "large deference" to
Congress, in its enumerated powers under the Four-
teenth Amendment, to enact laws that will eliminate
and remedy racial discrimination.
Adarand did not provide specific guidance on how
to apply strict scrutiny. The Court in effect implic-
itly referred to City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. v. FCC
59 F.3d 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC will waive the condition of pro-
portionate return on an international carrier's appli-
cation to provide international telephone service be-
tween Guayana and the U.S.
Holding:
The FCC's order denying a waiver is not arbi-
trary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
Discussion:
Under Section 214 of the Communications Act of
1934 telephone carriers must obtain FCC certifica-
tion to operate or construct interstate or international
communications lines. The FCC may apply condi-
tions in the public convenience or necessity. Atlantic
Tell-Network, Inc. ("ATN") applied to provide ser-
vice between Guayana and the U.S. It also pur-
chased 80 percent interest in the monopoly telephone
carrier in Guayana and planned to make over $100
million worth of telecommunication improvements.
ATN further proposed that for at least five years, all
"growth" traffic to the U.S. be allocated to ATN.
ATN claimed it would not receive any return traffic
otherwise since it was not an established carrier. The
FCC refused to alter the Common Carrier Bureau's
decision to require the proportionate return in order
to protect against anticompetitive conduct by ATN
since it had exclusive control over Guyana's
facilities.
Because of ATN's investment in Guayana, the
FCC's protection against possible discrimination by
ATN against competing domestic carriers was held
reasonable. Although ATN further argued that pro-
competitive factors should change the FCC's policy,
the FCC decided that disproportionate return would
not be in the public interest because of the power it
would give to ATN.
Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC
69 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC's Cellular eligibility restrictions
were arbitrary and capricious.
Holding:
The FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
adopting its Cellular eligibility restrictions.
Discussion:
The FCC allocated 120 Megahertz ("MHz") of
spectrum for a new wireless telecommunications ser-
[Vol. 4
1995 COURT DECISIONS
vice, Personal Communication Service ("PCS"),
which is expected to compete with existing Cellular,
Specialized Mobile, and Mobile Satellite Services.
The 120 MHz allocation was later divided into three
thirty-MHz blocks and three ten-MHz blocks.
Wireless telecommunications licenses are allocated
by auction and are distributed by geographic region.
At present, there are two competing Cellular provid-
ers in each geographic region. Citing concerns about
undue concentration of control over the wireless
spectrum, the FCC adopted rules that would restrict
Cellular providers whose existing territory incorpo-
rated more than ten percent of the population within
a new PCS territory to an acquisition limit of no
more than one ten-MHz block within that area. The
FCC also adopted a twenty percent "attribution"
rule for determining whether an entity would be
classified as a Cellular provider; i.e., an entity hold-
ing less than a twenty percent share in an existing
Cellular business would be free to acquire the total
allowable amount of spectrum for PCS per licensee
(forty MHz), while an entity holding more than a
twenty percent share would be subject to the ten
MHz restriction.
Cincinnati Bell and Radiofone filed petitions for
review of the restrictive provisions. The court agreed
with Cincinnati Bell in finding that the FCC's "at-
tribution" rules do not distinguish between a twenty-
one percent nonvoting interest and a voting nineteen
percent interest in a diversified ownership structure.
To the extent the FCC premised its rule on adminis-
trative convenience, the court found that the FCC
should have supplied a reasoned basis for not adopt-
ing less restrictive alternatives, and held the rule ar-
bitrary. The court disagreed with Radiofone's asser-
tion that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority in
promulgating its cross-ownership rules. The court
agreed, however, that the Cellular eligibility rules
were the product of arbitrary decision making in
light of the FCC's reliance on tangentially-related
"findings" and on "deference" to support its posi-
tion. The court also rejected Radiofone's claim that
the ownership restrictions unfairly discriminate
against Cellular providers, finding that differences
between wireless services provide a rational basis for
disparate treatment.
On a separate issue, Bell South appealed the
FCC's decision not to repeal a restriction that re-
quires Bell Operating Companies to offer cellular
services through structurally separate subsidiaries. In
finding that the FCC's refusal to remove the re-
quirement was arbitrary and capricious, the court
reviewed the restriction's fourteen-year history, noted
that it severely penalizes the Bell Companies at a
time when the communications industry is explod-
ing, and remanded the matter to the Commission for
prompt consideration.
Committee for Effective Cellular Rules v. FCC
53 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC properly acted within its rule
making authority when it redefined the Cellular Ge-
ographic Service Areas of all existing cellular
licensees.
Holding:
The FCC properly acted within its rule making
authority.
Discussion:
The FCC properly changed the definition of Cel-
lular Geographic Service Areas through notice-and-
comment rule making. The Commission's decision to
postpone the acceptance of "unserved area" applica-
tions until it had determined the technical require-
ment for those applications was proper. Moreover,
the rule established was one of general applicability,
not an individual action.
COMSAT Corp. v. Finshipyards S.A.M.
900 F. Supp. 515 (D.D.C. 1995)
Issue:
Whether a federal district court has personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident accounting authority
pursuant to a Long Arm Statute or the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.
Holding:
The district court does not have jurisdiction over a
nonresident accounting authority.
Discussion:
COMSAT, the American satellite telecommunica-
tions provider contracted with the Republic of Zaire
to provide telecommunications service for Zaire. Fin-
shipyards was appointed to act as an accounting au-
thority between COMSAT and Zaire. When Zaire
failed to pay its phone bill to Finshipyards, the ac-
counting authority in turn failed to pay COMSAT.
COMSAT argued that Finshipyards should be
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subject to jurisdiction pursuant to the District of Co-
lumbia's Long Arm Statute or in the alternative pur-
suant to the Communications Act and Rule 4(k) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court held that Finshipyards was not
covered by the Long Arm Statute because it did not
have significant contacts, it had not transacted busi-
ness, and it did not contract to supply services in the
District of Columbia.
COMSAT's argument that Rule 4(k)(2) sup-
ported jurisdiction over Finshipyards also failed. The
court determined that there was no federal question
under the Communications Act.
MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. FCC
57 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC provided adequate notice for
rule making proceedings under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA").
Holding:
The FCC's placement of a single footnote in the
background section of a rule making announcement
was insufficient notice under the APA.
Discussion:
The FCC issued a notice of proposed rule making
in order to make changes to tariffing policies involv-
ing Bell Operating Companies. In a footnote to the
"Background" section of the notice, the FCC pro-
posed eliminating certain "bundled" groups devel-
oped for interexchange carriers ("IXCs"). The FCC
ordered this in its final rule.
Plaintiffs asserted that the use of the footnote was
insufficient notice and that FCC's order was arbi-
trary and capricious under the APA. The FCC ar-
gued that, even without the footnote, any inter-
exchange carrier should have notice because they are
aware that any proposed change in these rules might
affect them. This argument was rejected outright by
the court. Second, the FCC pointed out that a care-
ful reader would have adequate notice through the
footnote. The court rejected this argument by noting
that, while the use of the footnote alone is not neces-
sarily fatal, it is a major consideration in determin-
ing the adequacy of the notice. In examining this
particular placement by the FCC, the court noted
that it could hardly have found a more obscure
placement. However, the intent of the agency is not
the question to be asked, according to the court. The
question is whether the notice was adequate under
the APA and, here, the court found that it was not.
Lastly, the FCC argued that, since a few parties in-
volved in the rule making proceedings commented on
the proposal placed in the footnote, the notice was
adequate. According to the court, the fact that com-
ments were received does not make the initial notice
adequate under the APA. Furthermore, only one of
these parties had actual notice of the proposal, which
it received through ex parte communications with
FCC staff.
MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. FCC
59 F.3d 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC adopted a lawful approach to
awarding damages to interexchange carriers
("IXCs") for overcharges by local exchange carriers
("LECs") above their approved rate of return.
Holding:
The FCC's general approach for determining
damages for LEC overcharges is lawful, however,
the FCC's allowance of an offset for undercharges
for other services is unlawful.
Discussion:
The court first concluded that because the FCC's
rate-of-return methodology for establishing maxi-
mum rates has the force of law, the FCC may treat
overcharges as a per se violation of the Communica-
tion Act's requirement that a Common Carrier
maintain "just and reasonable" rates.
The court also rejected the LECs' claim that the
FCC failed to require the IXCs adequately to prove
their damages. The court stated that the determina-
tion of a reasonable rate under a rate-of-return
methodology will necessarily be an estimate only.
Consequently, it would be inequitable to require the
IXCs to identify the specific rate that could reasona-
bly have been charged when the LECs were them-
selves unable to do so. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that, because the IXCs' estimate of the
reasonable rate was conservative, the FCC was justi-
fied in relying on this estimate to access overcharges.
The court also upheld the FCC's use of the dis-
covery-of-injury rule to determine when the claims
of the IXCs accrued and agreed with the FCC that
the cause of action for damages under the Communi-
cations Act does not accrue until the LEC files its
final report. In this regard, the court stated that reli-
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ance on an LEC's final earnings report as the point
at which a cause of action for damages accrues
would be proper given that the reason for the final
report is to allow the LEC time to adjust the data in
its preliminary report. In addition, the court rea-
soned that because the preliminary report is subject
to adjustment, it is unreasonable to assume that an
LEC's preliminary report is a reliable indicator of
whether the LEC has overcharged.
Finally, the court concluded that the FCC's "lim-
ited offset" rule is unlawful because it violates the
FCC's own precedent, the rate of return regime, and
statutory and regulatory prohibitions against rate
discrimination. The court stated that the determina-
tion of an offset involves a matter over which the
FCC itself concluded it did not have jurisdiction -
the adjudication of a carriers rights against a cus-
tomer. Moreover, the court stated that an award of
an offset implies that the defendant LEC is entitled
to earn more than it actually earned for the rate it
charged. The court added that the award of an offset
effectively discriminates against IXCs that bring
damages claims because those that do not are not re-
quired to reimburse or offset undercharges.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts,
Inc.
71 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether a federal district court has subject matter
jurisdiction over an action for failure to pay for long
distance telephone service when the terms and condi-
tions of such service was provided for in a FCC
tariff; and whether an action for failure to pay for
long distance telephone service is barred by the stat-
ute of limitations; and whether the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction requires that the question of Bell's
liability be decided by the Pennsylvania Public Utili-
ties Commission ("PUC").
Holding:
The federal district court has subject matter juris-
diction over an action involving an FCC tariff. The
action here was untimely as to some bills, but timely
as to others. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction re-
quires that the question of liability be decided by the
PUC.
Discussion:
A claim "arises under" federal law when a right
created by federal law is an essential element of the
plaintiff's action. Here, MCI's action was based on a
tariff created under the authority of the Federal
Communications Commission, thus, the action
"arose under" federal law. The Third Circuit joined
several other circuits in splitting with the Fifth Cir-
cuit on this issue.
The Communications Act of 1934 provides that
actions by carriers for recovery of their charges must
be filed within two years. The court ruled that a
cause of action accrues at the time the bills become
past due under the terms of a tariff. Here, the tariff
stated that amounts not paid within thirty days of
the invoice date would be considered past due..Thus,
MCI's action was held untimely as to the amounts
owed on bills which were dated more than two years
and thirty days before the action was filed, but the
action was held timely as to all subsequent bills.
Where a regulatory scheme places an administra-
tive agency over the resolution of certain issues, the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires a court to
transfer a case to the agency insofar as it involves
those issues. In Pennsylvania the PUC is the agency
responsible for adjudication of issues involving the
adequacy of public utility services. Here, the third-
party claim centers around the adequacy of Bell's
dial tone in preventing fraudulent use of long dis-
tance services. Because Bell is a public utility, the
PUC should decide whether Bell is liable.
Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v.
FCC
46 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC acted in an arbitrary or capri-
cious manner without the support of the record and
whether the FCC commissioners should have re-
cused themselves where bias forming waiver was
alleged.
Holding:
The FCC did not act in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner and the FCC's decision to grant Fox a
permanent waiver from cross-ownership ban was
supported by the record. The FCC Chairman did
not have to recuse himself.
Discussion:
The- court sided with Fox's argument that no
other purchaser demonstrated a willingness to un-
dertake the large financial burden of revitalizing the
New York Post and upholding the cross-ownership
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ban would result in elimination of a competitive
voice. Under the FCC guidelines, cross-ownership
rules may be waived if the purposes of the rule
would be disserved by divestiture.
The court also held that the FCC Chairman was
not under an obligation to recuse himself from this
matter because the court would set aside a decision
not to recuse an administrative agency member only
when it demonstrates that the member's mind is
made about important and specific factual questions
contrary to evidence.
National Communications Association, Inc. v.
AT&T
46 F.3d 220 (2nd Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether primary jurisdiction should be extended
to an agency when enforcement of the agency's pro-
gram is in question.
Holding:
Where technical policy issues, risk of inconsistent
interpretation, and unfair administration of justice
are not at issue, federal district courts may be
granted jurisdiction.
Discussion:
The plaintiffs, a reseller of telecommunications
services, brought suit against AT&T alleging unrea-
sonable practices and unlawful discrimination in vio-
lation of the Federal Communications Act of 1934.
NCA sought ten million dollars and an injunction.
Defendant, AT&T, moved to refer the case to the
FCC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
district court found that referral was necessary based
on a need for agency expertise and a danger of in-
consistent rulings.
The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that
there were no technical or policy issues involving
complex interpretations. The issues were not so
unique and narrow that a district court posed a risk
of inconsistent interpretation. The court held that the
district court was better equipped than the FCC to
make an expeditious ruling, thus, the plaintiffs are
not precluded from bringing suit in district court by
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Pacific Land Sales, Inc. v. Plotkin
187 B.R. 302 (1995)
Issue:
Whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discre-
tion when it issued an injunction regulating the con-
duct of parties before the FCC.
Holding:
As long as the injunction remains outside of the
FCC's exclusive jurisdiction over the licensing
power, the Bankruptcy Court has authority to enjoin
parties from taking action before the FCC.
Discussion:
This case arose from a Chapter 7 trustee's motion
for injunction against Appellants. The Order granted
the injunction and enjoined Appellants from interfer-
ing with the running of the debtor's radio station,
including making false representations to the FCC.
The court found that the imposition of such a sanc-
tion was allowable as long, as it did not interfere
with the FCC's exclusive power over licensing. In
this case, the injunction was deemed valid as it
merely prohibited the Appellants from practicing a
fraud on the FCC at the expense of the Trustee, the
creditors of the Debtor, and the Bankruptcy Court
and from interfering with the rights of the radio
station.
Press Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. FCC
59 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC's reversal of its Video Services
Division decision and the extension of Rainbow's
construction permit over the objection of Press that
improper ex parte contacts influenced the proceed-
ing; whether the Commission's decision was arbi-
trary and capricious.
Holding:
The FCC's decision was not tainted by the con-
tacts but the FCC's finding with respect to Rain-
bow's conduct was arbitrary and the court granted
petition for review.
Discussion:
Rainbow was awarded the construction permit in
1984, it has since delayed construction. After several
objections, Video Services granted a Press' objection
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and cancelled Rainbow's permit.
Ex parte contacts then arose when Rainbow's
counsel telephoned the chief of the FCC Mass Me-
dia Bureau, Stewart, asking whether the cancellation
was consistent with the FCC policy encouraging mi-
nority ownership. The second contact, a meeting
with several FCC officials, Rainbow was advised
how to obtain favorable reconsideration, according to
Press. Stewart eventually granted that petition for
reconsideration and granted an eight month con-
struction extension. Press filed an emergency petition
that ex parte contacts had tainted the adjudication.
The Mass Media Bureau recused itself and the FCC
Office of General Counsel took over for de novo
review.
The Commission vacated the Video Services can-
cellation of the permit. Agreeing that the contacts
were improper, it concluded that the violation was
mitigated by Rainbow's sincere belief that the con-
tact was permissible. The FCC found Press hadn't
made a prima facie case that Rainbow lacked the
requisite assurance of financing.
Upon review, the court found a violation of the ex
parte rules by Rainbow but concluded that the
FCC's adjudication was not irrevocably tainted in
light of the Mass Media Bureau's recusal and the
full Commission's de novo review. Rainbow's contact
extended only to persons who played no role in the
Commission's ultimate decision. The court dismissed
the notion that Rainbow and its counsel "sincerely
believed" the matter was unrestricted since FCC had
repeatedly instructed Rainbow's counsel that it was
considered restricted.
As to an extension for tower construction and
Rainbow's financial qualifications, the court re-
manded both issues to FCC for further
consideration.
Finally, the FCC was found to have inconsistently
applied 47 C.F.R. § 73.3598(a) which allowed con-
struction permits to be granted for "no more than 24
months from the date of issuance of the original con-
struction permit." In order to qualify past that date,
which Rainbow was, Rainbow must make a showing
under b(1) progress or b(2) hardship. The court
finds FCC's failure to impose this rule on Rainbow
was arbitrary.
Sacramento RSA Limited Partnership v. FCC
56 F.3d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC properly denied a limited part-
nership's application for a cellular license when one
of the limited partners was an alien.
Holding:
The FCC's denial of the application was proper.
Discussion:
Section 310(b)(3) of the Communications Act of
1934 prohibits the award of a radio license to "any
corporation of which any officer or director is an
alien." The FCC subsequently applied this section
to partnerships, finding that Congress intended to
prohibit aliens from holding "high level management
positions" in radio licensees. Here, the court found
that the FCC's application of Section 310(b)(3) to
limited partnerships was not an impermissible inter-
pretation of the Act. Moreover, the FCC must con-
sider the "potential control" of an alien partner
rather than the actual control exercised by the part-
ner at the time the application is considered. The
"potential control" test will prevent limited partner-
ships from excluding an alien from management of
the business while the application is pending and
bringing the alien into a position of control after the
application is granted.
SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC
56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC's decision in approving a pro-
posed merger was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Holding:
The FCC's decision was not arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law.
Discussion:
The court found that the appellants failed to show
that the proposed merger was contrary to the public
interest and that the FCC's conclusions were
erroneous.
The appellants put forth several arguments chal-
lenging the criteria and emphasis of the Commis-
sion's public interest analysis of the proposed
merger. These arguments were rejected by the court,
which found that the FCC examined the necessary
criteria and that a few of the appellants' contentions
were wrong as a matter of fact. Next, it was argued
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that the FCC erred in not adopting two proposed
conditions intended to prevent anti-competitive prac-
tices. However, the court found that the competitive
practices at issue would result in lower prices for
consumers and thus be in accord with the public in-
terest. The argument that the merger may result in
the misuse of confidential information was also re-
jected by the court because there are existing safe-
guards in this area and it has not been a problem in
the past. Lastly, appellants challenged several proce-
dures followed by the FCC. However, the court de-
termined that these decisions were well within
agency discretion.
ANTITRUST ISSUES
AT&T v. IMR Capital Corp.
888 F. Supp. 221 (D. Mass. 1995)
Issue:
Whether New England Telephone ("NET") and
AT&T violated state and federal antitrust laws, Sec-
tions 201(b) and 202(a) of the Communications Act
of 1934, and committed various common law torts by
engaging in unfair trade practices with respect to
billing and service obligations to Consumer Owned
Coin Operated Telephone ("COCOT") owners.
Holding:
The court refused to dismiss most of the claims
against NET concerning the antitrust violations be-
cause much of NET's alleged conduct was not sanc-
tioned by state policies and therefore not protected
by state action immunity. But, the counts under Sec-
tions 201(b) and 202(a) were dismissed because the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has
primary jurisdiction with respect to the issues in this
case. Similarly, the court dismissed IMR's claims
under M.G.L. ch. 159, because that chapter allocates
to the DPU the authority to determine what rates
and practices are reasonable and the court's jurisdic-
tion is limited to reviewing such determinations. In
addition, the common law tort claims were dismissed
for failing to state causes of action.
With respect to AT&T, the court dismissed all
counts claiming violation of the antitrust laws, be-
cause IMR failed to show that AT&T exercised
market power to IMR's detriment. The court al-
lowed IMR's cause of action under the Communica-
tions Act with respect to the collection of charges for
operator-assisted calls because there is no assumption
that the calls would be billed to the originating num-
ber. The court also dismissed the claim under
M.G.L. ch. 93A, because IMR failed to allege
fraud. Lastly, IMR's claim for tortious interference
with contractual relations failed because IMR in no
way showed that AT&T knowingly induced a third
party to break its contract with IMR.
Discussion:
This case arose out of payphone owner IMR's al-
legations that NET and AT&T engaged in unfair
trade practices, violated state and federal antitrust
laws, violated Sections 201(b) and 202(a) of the
Communications Act, and committed various com-
mon law torts.
The antitrust claims against NET, based on
claims of service discrimination and the charging of
unreasonable rates, were not summarily dismissed
under the State Action Doctrine because at least
some of the practices alleged by IMR were not in
any way sanctioned by state policy. The doctrine
protects companies by offering them immunity from
suit when they are following state sanctioned poli-
cies, except in the case of DPU approved price
structures.
With respect to the alleged violations under the
Communications Act, the court declined to rule on
them, stating that deference to the FCC was war-
ranted in light of their expertise and the fact that
they have not yet addressed any of the issues
presented in the instant cause of action.
Similarly, the court found that IMR failed to state
a claim under M.G.L. ch. 159 because the matter
must first be brought up before the DPU. In addi-
tion, the court dismissed the various common law
claims for failing to state causes of action.
With respect to the alleged antitrust violations
against AT&T, the court dismissed IMR's claims
because IMR failed to show that AT&T exercised
market power to IMR's detriment. Moreover, in re-
lation to the claims that AT&T violated the Com-
munications Act, AT&T's motion for summary
judgment was allowed with respect to the collection
of charges for direct-dialed calls and denied with re-
spect to the collection of charges for operator-assisted
calls. Additionally, IMR failed to state a claim con-
cerning AT&T's alleged violation of M.G.L. ch.
93A because there was no showing that AT&T com-
mitted fraud. Similarly, the claim for tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations failed because
IMR did not indicate how AT&T's conduct could




KVHP TV Partners, Ltd. v. Channel 12 of Beau-
mont, Inc.
874 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
Issue:
Whether federal antitrust law or the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 completely preempts state law for
purposes of removal jurisdiction.
Holding:
For purposes of removal jurisdiction, legislative
history must support complete preemption and the
statute must contain a clear manifestation of Con-
gressional intent to remove an action through a spe-
cific jurisdictional grant.
Discussion:
KVHP TV ("Fox 29") brought an action against
a competitor station and program syndicators Mul-
timedia Entertainment and Viacom International for
allegedly preventing KVHP from obtaining certain
programming. The complaint alleged various state
law claims, but alleged no violations of federal stat-
utes nor pled any federal cause of action. Mul-
timedia and Viacom sought to remove the case to
federal court, arguing inter alia that both federal an-
titrust law and the Communications Act of 1934
completely preempt state law so that any civil com-
plaint arising in these fields is necessarily federal in
character.
On motion to remand, the court strictly construed
removal jurisdiction, discussing first the well-pleaded
complaint rule. The court noted that, generally, the
plaintiff is the master of his complaint and that, ab-
sent diversity, a defendant may only remove a case to
federal court if a federal cause of action appears on
the face of the complaint: jurisdiction may not be
predicated on a federal defense, including the defense
of preemption.
The court then discussed two exceptions to the
well-pleaded complaint rule: the artful pleading doc-
trine and the complete preemption doctrine. The art-
ful pleading doctrine states that a plaintiff may not
avoid federal jurisdiction by artfully disguising a fed-
eral claim as a state cause of action. The court found
that the state law claims in the present complaint did
not arise under federal law, and that there was no
evidence to support federal jurisdiction as imposed
by the artful pleading doctrine. Turning to the com-
plete preemption doctrine, the court reiterated the
general rule that the defense of preemption may not
serve as the basis for federal court jurisdiction. Ac-
knowledging that there are certain instances where
federal law will completely preempt state law even
for purposes of removal jurisdiction, the court re-
viewed the development of the doctrine in cases in-
volving labor relations, workers' compensation and
ERISA. The court found that the doctrine was up-
held when the statutes in question contained specific
jurisdictional grants and legislative histories that
supported complete preemption. The legislative his-
tory of the antitrust law shows that it was intended
to supplement, not displace, state law; the Commu-
nications Act contains a saving clause (47 U.S.C.
§ 414) that expressly preserves certain state causes
of action. The doctrine of complete preemption,
therefore, cannot apply.
Since neither exception to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule was applicable here, the case was re-
manded to state court.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Graphnet,
Inc.
881 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.J. 1995)
Issue:
Whether aiding and abetting is an independent
cause of action under the Sherman Antitrust Act and
whether claims of fraud or breach of contract actions
are precluded by the filed rate doctrine or preempted
by the 1934 Federal Communications Act.
Holding:
The Sherman Antitrust Act does not provide an
independent cause of action for aiding and abetting
where there is no violation of the act on its face. The
Federal Communications Act preempts causes of ac-
tion where they arise in direct relation to a provision
of interstate communications services. Therefore, the
filed rate doctrine, codified in the Federal Communi-
cations Act, precludes causes of action based on
claims that a party has a right to pay a rate other
that the filed tariff rate.
Discussion:
Telecommunications, Co. brought suit against De-
fendant, Graphnet, to recover for voice transmission
services provided to the carrier. Graphnet counter-
claimed alleging that Plaintiff, in an effort to mo-
nopolize their market, violated section 2 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. Graphnet also counterclaimed for
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fraud in the inducement and breach of contract.
The district court held that Graphnet failed to
state a valid counterclaim in regard to the Sherman
Act violation, reasoning that the Sherman Act did
not directly apply to aiding and abetting monopolis-
tic conduct where there was no violation of the Act
itself.
The court took up the contract claims separately.
The court found that the filed rate doctrine pre-
cluded claims directly related to the tariff rates, but
did not preclude the breach of contract claim related
to the credits for poor service quality.
BROADCAST ISSUES
Arons v. Donovan
882 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.J. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the 1934 Federal Communications Act
creates a private cause of action where a candidate
seeks a right to be heard over the public airwaves.
Holding:
The Act does not create a private cause of action.
Discussion:
The plaintiff was a gubernatorial candidate in the
state of New Jersey. After losing the race, plaintiff
brought action against the state broadcasting author-
ity and state elections officials alleging that she was
unfairly excluded from gubernatorial debates.
The district court held that Plaintiff's claim was
not moot even though elections had been held be-
cause such issues would persist in future elections.
The court further held that the Federal Communica-
tions Act provision requiring broadcasters to operate
in the public interest, and to provide equal access did
not create a private cause of action.
The court also held that the state broadcasting au-
thority's decision to exclude an independent guber-
natorial candidate from debates did not violate the
First Amendment because the decision was view-
point neutral.
Fulani v. FCC
49 F.3d 904 (2d Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC erroneously exempted an ABC
News program featuring Ross Perot from the equal
time provisions of the Communications Act.
Holding:
The ABC News program constituted a "bona fide
news interview," one of the four program categories
that Congress expressly exempted from the equal
time requirements.
Discussion:
In 1992, ABC News broadcast a program during
its regular "Nightline" time slot, which featured an
interview with then-presidential candidate Ross Pe-
rot. The program allowed members of a live studio
audience to ask Mr. Perot questions. After the pro-
gram aired, Lenora B. Fulani, an independent can-
didate for president, requested "equal time" on the
network. When ABC refused her request, she filed a
complaint with the FCC, which ruled that the ABC
News program fell under one of the exceptions to
the "equal time" requirement.
Section 314(a) of the Communications Act of 1934
requires broadcasters to provide "equal time" to all
other legally qualified candidates whenever it per-
mits one qualified candidate the opportunity to use
its facilities. In 1959, however, Congress carved four
exceptions into the "equal time" requirements, in-
cluding one for "bona fide news interviews." Subse-
quent FCC caselaw defined three elements for this
exception to apply. First, the program must be one
that is regularly scheduled. Second, the broadcaster
must have control over the program. Third, decisions
regarding the program's format, content and partici-
pants must be based on reasonable journalistic judg-
ment, rather than a partisan desire to advance the
candidacy of a particular candidate.
The court of appeals concluded that the FCC de-
cision, that the ABC News program was a bona fide
news interview, was not arbitrary or capricious.
First, the program was a special episode of ABC's
regularly scheduled "Nightline" program. Second,
although program host Peter Jennings allowed mem-
bers of the audience to ask Mr. Perot questions,
these questions were pre-approved by program pro-
ducers and ABC retained control over the program.
Finally, given the great public interest in Mr. Perot,
ABC's decision to devote a program to interview him




Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Comcast Cable of
Paducah, Inc.
881 F. Supp. 285 (W.D, Ky. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the 1992 Cable Act expressly provides
for a federal cause of action.
Holding:
The 1992 Cable Act does not expressly provide
for a federal cause of action.
Discussion:
The Plaintiff, Commonwealth of Kentucky,
brought action in the state court against the Defend-
ant Company, alleging violations of the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act and the 1992 Cable Act's
prohibition against negative option billing. The De-
fendant removed the action to federal district court
asserting federal question jurisdiction.
The Defendant argued that the 1992 Cable Act
created a federal remedy and that federal jurisdiction
was proper because of federal preemption.
The district court held that Congress specifically
provided for concurrent enforcement of the 1992
Cable Act by the FCC and state authorities. Fur-
ther, the United States Supreme Court mandates
that federal question jurisdiction is available only
where a plaintiff's right to relief depends on a sub-
stantial question of federal law. Thus, the court held
that Congress did not completely preempt cable reg-
ulation so as to confer federal question jurisdiction
exclusively. Furthermore, the court concluded that
because the state law at issue was not co-extensive
with the 1992 Cable Act, federal consideration was
not mandatory.
Glendora v. Cable Systems Corporation
893 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. N.Y. 1995)
Issue:
Whether a cable programmer has an implied fed-
eral cause of action under the Communications Act
that governs editorial control by the cable operator;
whether the company is a "state actor" under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Holding:
The cable programmer has an implied right of ac-
tion under the Communications Act and the com-
pany is not a state actor under either the state-func-
tion approach or symbiotic relationship approach.
Discussion:
In holding that the programmer had a private
right of action, the court cited section 531 of the
Cable Act, which states "a cable operator shall not
exercise any editorial control over any public, educa-
tional, or governmental use of channel capacity."
The court looked at congressional intent of the Act
and the guidelines in Cort v. Ash, 444 U.S. 11
(1979), and found that Glendora fell within the class
of persons to be protected under the Act.
Further, the court rejected the argument that
Cablevision was a state actor. The court found that
the ownership and operation of entertainment facili-
ties were not powers exclusively reserved to the
State, nor were they functions of sovereignty.
Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC
56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
The court issued three separate opinions in this
case, each authored by a different judge and address-
ing a distinct category of issues in the case.
Ginsburg: Rate Issues
Whether the FCC's rate making process results in
rates that are too low, violates the Cable Television
and Consumer Protection Act of 1992 ("Cable
Act"), and is otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
The court found that the FCC's decision to adopt
a 17 percent initial rate reduction is supported with
substantial evidence, and the FCC articulated a ra-
tional connection between the facts it found based
upon that evidence and its decision to adopt a the 17
percent rate reduction. Specifically, the court stated
that the FCC's decision to give the data for low pen-
etration systems little weight in establishing the com-
petitive differential that forms the basis for the ini-
tial rate reduction, while relying primarily on
overbuild data for simulating competitive rates was
reasonable in light of the declared purpose of the
Cable Act to eliminate the effects of undue market
power. The court also found reasonable the FCC's
assumption of a linear relationship between the in-
tensity of competition in an area and the percentage
of overlap between each pair of overbuilt systems. In
addition, the court concluded that the Commission
was justified in applying the 17 percent differential
to both large and small systems, and that adopting
the 17 percent reduction as a general rule subject to
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well-targeted exceptions, "effectively balanced its
twin responsibilities of ensuring reasonable rates and
reducing administrative burdens."
The court next addressed the FCC's decision to
adopt a price cap regime for regulating future rates,
and ultimately concluded that the Commission's de-
cision to preclude a rate adjustment to recover exter-
nal costs incurred during the period between the
passage of the Cable Act and the date upon which
each cable operator actually became subject to rate
regulation under the Act (the "gap period") is arbi-
trary and capricious. The court stated that the
FCC's justification for its decision are unacceptable
in light of the FCC's finding that cable companies
will incur such costs, yet, under the regulations, they
would never be able to recover those costs.
The court accepted, however, the FCC's applica-
tion of its rate making rules in the same manner for
the basic service tier and the cable programming ser-
vice tier, i.e. tier neutrality. The court stated that the
Cable Act supported the Commission's approach.
The court added that the FCC appropriately consid-
ered and accounted for the differences in the tiers
when adopting the tier-neutral approach. The court
also found that the FCC had not acted unreasonably
in failing to give each cable operator the option of
coming under an overall rate by lowering its basic
tier rate and raising its cable programming service
rate.
Randolph: First Amendment Issues
Whether the FCC's rate regulations violate the
First Amendment rights of cable operators.
The court first concluded that the rate regulations
are subject to intermediate scrutiny and are not un-
constitutional. The court found that the cable rate
regulations are not content-based because they ap-
plied to all cable systems not facing effective compe-
tition regardless of the content of their programming.
The court stated that the FCC has appropriately fo-
cused on the method of transporting speech rather
than content of the speech. The court further stated
that any potential the rate regulations have for im-
pacting the content of an operators programming is
adequately mitigated by the FCC's cost-of-service
rate option, and through incentives to expand cable
programming. Therefore, the court concluded that,
like the must-carry rules in Turner, the cable rate
regulations "are not structured in a manner that car-
ries the inherent risk of undermining First Amend-
ment interest."
Moreover, the court found that the FCC's interest
in regulating cable rates to protect consumers from
monopoly prices is "always substantial." The court
stated that the fact that the rate regulations cause
operators to incur expenses does not make the regu-
lation more restrictive than necessary. Particularly in
light of the fact that the alternative - a separate
cost-of-service proceeding for each regulated cable
system - would cause operators to incur even
greater expense, and would create a more significant
administrative burden.
Rogers: Scope of Rate Regulation Issues
Whether the FCC's rate regulation rules appro-
priately apply the Cable Act.
The court concluded that the FCC's rules miscon-
strued or misapplied the Cable Act in four ways.
First, the FCC erred by too narrowly construing the
Cable Act's definition of "effective competition."
Specifically, the court stated that the FCC's redefini-
tion of overbuilds conflicts with the plain language of
the statute. The court concluded that the Cable Act
requires the FCC to include the customer of mul-
tichannel video programming distributors other than
the largest in determining whether 15% of the house-
holds in the franchise area subscribe to cable ser-
vices. The FCC considered only those multichannel
video programming distributors that offer program-
ming to at least 50 percent of the households in the
franchise area."
The court also concluded that the FCC's interpre-
tation of the uniform rate structure conflicts with the
plain language of the Cable Act. The court stated
that the FCC's requirement that competitive systems
charge undermined the Cable Act's purpose to allow
market forces to determine the rate charged by sys-
tems subject to "effective competition."
Next, the court concluded that the FCC's inter-
pretation of the tier buy-through provision of the
Cable Act is not permissible under the act. The
Commission determined that the tier buy-through
provision applies not only to regulated systems, but
also those subject to "effective competition." The
court concluded that because the tier buy-through
provision applies to any basic tier establish pursuant
to the Cable Act, and clearly states an intention to
regulate rates, it cannot apply to systems that are
subject to "effective competition."
The court addressed whether the Cable Act pre-
empted certain state authority and concluded that,
although the Cable Act did not preempt state nega-
tive option billing laws either expressly or through
occupation of the field, it did require preemption of
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franchising agreements specifying the contents of the
basic service tier. The court concluded that the FCC
could allow franchising authorities to order refunds
to remedy unreasonable basic tier service rates. Simi-
larly, the court stated that the FCC correctly con-
cluded that the Cable Act "clearly expresses Con-
gress' intention" to allow cable operators to make
basic tier programming decisions.
Finally, the court concluded that the FCC's single
basic tier requirement is a permissible interpretation
under the Cable Act. The court also found permissi-
ble the FCC's decision to assume regulation of the
basic tier only after a showing by the relevant
franchising authority that its franchising fees are in-
sufficient to cover its costs of regulation.
Time Warner Cable v. Doyle
66 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether a state's prohibition of certain negative
option billing practices may be preempted by the
1992 Cable Act.
Holding:
State consumer laws that are in conflict with cable
rate regulations may be preempted.
Discussion:
The FCC promulgated various rate regulations
following the passage of the 1992 Cable Act. In re-
sponse, Time Warner Cable restructured the service
tiers that it offered to subscribers in several Wiscon-
sin communities by removing certain channels from
its "basic" and "standard" tiers. The deleted chan-
nels were offered to customers on an "a la carte" ba-
sis for an additional fee. Existing customers contin-
ued to receive the same number of channels they had
received prior to Time Warner's "unbundling," and
were automatically charged the additional fee for the
a la carte package, Those who had already sub-
scribed to both the basic and standard tiers noticed
no difference in their monthly bill because of
changes in Time Warner's overall pricing structure.
All existing customers were notified of the changes
and were informed that they could call and cancel if
they did not want the a la carte package. The State
of Wisconsin believed that Time Warner's billing
policy constituted "negative option billing" and
brought an enforcement action enjoining Time
Warner from charging for the a la carte package un-
less customers specifically requested it. The State
also sought an order requiring Time Warner to dis-
gorge the income it had earned from its unfair trade
practices in violation of Wisconsin Statute section
100.20. Time Warner filed suit in federal district
court seeking to enjoin the state administrative pro-
ceeding. The district court entered a judgment for
Wisconsin, and Time Warner appealed.
In reversing, the court of appeals first noted the
district court's findings that the 1992 Cable Act con-
tains a prohibition of negative option billing, but
that the FCC had carved out an exception for "the
addition or deletion of specific channels from an ex-
isting tier or service." Wisconsin had argued that
this regulation was contrary to the Cable Act and
was therefore invalid. The district court accepted this
argument and also rejected Time Warner's claim
that the Wisconsin unfair trade practices statute was
preempted because it effectively regulated cable
rates. The court of appeals then addressed the issue
of federal preemption of state law, pointing out that
preemption may occur through the promulgation of
federal regulations provided that an agency both in-
tended to preempt and that it possessed the requisite
power to do so. Submitting the agency's regulation to
Chevron's two-part analysis, the court found that
Congress had not spoken to the issue so unambigu-
ously as to preclude further interpretation by the
agency, and that the FCC's rule was a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory language. The court
then reviewed the policy conflict pitting federal con-
trol over cable rate structures against state consumer
protection measures, and finally reached its narrow
holding that Time Warner's actions were permitted
by limited preemptive regulation.
Turner Broadcasting v. FCC
910 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the must-carry provisions of the 1992
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act violate the First Amendment; whether inter-
mediate level scrutiny was proper.
Holding:
Intermediate scrutiny was proper and the must-
carry provisions of the 1992 Act are narrowly tai-
lored to further an important governmental interest
and therefore, do not violate the First Amendment.
Discussion:
The 1992 Cable Act's must-carry requirements
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mandate that cable operators carry the signals of a
certain number of broadcasters. Cable operators al-
leged that this violated their First Amendment
rights. Congressional reasoning that must-carry pro-
visions were necessary to protect local broadcast sta-
tions was held to be reasonable by the district court
on remand. The court also held that the burden to
the cable industry was small. Therefore, under inter-
mediate scrutiny, the 1992 Cable Act's must-carry
provisions meet the narrowly tailored substantial
governmental interest standard, necessary when the
government invokes content-neutral restrictions on
speech.
VJC Productions, Inc. v. Kydes
903 F. Supp. 42 (S.D. Ga. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the defendant in a civil case is entitled to
attorney fees and expenses under the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act.
Holding:
The Cable Communications Policy Act does not
allow for the prevailing defendant to recover attor-
ney fees and expenses.
Discussion:
According to the language of the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act, the aggrieved party is the only
party who may seek relief, not the prevailing party.
Here, the defendant is not the aggrieved party.
However, the defendant may wish to seek relief
under other statutes or rules.
COMMON CARRIER ISSUES
Florida Public Telecommunications Association
v. FCC
54 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC, under section 226(e)(2) of the
Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improve-
ment Act of 1990 ("TOCSIA"), can prescribe com-
pensation for subscriber-800 calls.
Holding:
The words "routed to" in section 226(e)(2) also
include subscriber-800 calls. The FCC's insistence
that the plain language of section 226(e)(2) gives it
authority only to prescribe compensation for access-
code calls is contrary to the plain language of the
statute.
Discussion:
Section 226(e)(2) of TOCSIA allows the FCC to
prescribe compensation for owners of competitive
public pay telephones for calls that are "routed to"
providers other than the presubscribed operators.
The FCC claimed that this section only applies to
access-code calls because subscriber-800 calls do not
stop temporarily at the provider's platform words
and thus, from the callers perspective, are not
"routed to" a provider. The FCC claimed that Con-
gress passed TOCSIA to protect consumers. Since
subscriber-800 calls are not billed to consumers, such
calls do not fall within the protection of section
226(e)(2).
The court of appeals disagreed. Technically, both
access-code and subscriber-800 calls are "routed to"
a provider, switching from a local exchange carrier
to an interexchange operator services provider. Pre-
vious FCC orders even used the phrase "routed to"
to describe this process for subscriber-800 calls. The
fact that a caller may be unaware that his call is be-
ing "routed to" a provider does not remove sub-
scriber-800 calls from this provision. There is noth-
ing in the Act to indicate that the use of the phrase
"routed to" only applies to access-code calls. Finally,
the court noted that TOCSIA was designed to pro-
tect both consumers and service providers. Therefore,
section 226(e)(2) does apply to subscriber-800 calls.
MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. FCC
59 F.3d 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC's approach to awarding dam-
ages to interexchange carriers ("IXCs") for
overcharges by local exchange carriers ("LECs") is
lawful.
Holding:
The FCC's approach for determining damages is
not unlawful, however, the FCC's limited offset pol-
icy is unlawful.
Discussion:
In an earlier case, the court found that automatic
refunds for specific types of services that exceed the
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proscribed maximum rate of return, arbitrary and
capricious. Here, IXCs request the return of
overcharges, charges above the maximum rate either
per category or in total. The FCC allowed the LECs
to limit the offsets by subtracting from the amount
that the IXCs overpaid, the amount that the same
customer underpaid the LEC for that category dur-
ing the same period.
The court found that while the damage award
might result in a LEC earning less than the maxi-
mum rate of return in total, LEC's were still making
an overall reasonable return and no LEC made a
showing of an unreasonably low return rate. The
LEC's rate of return violations would be considered
a per se violation of the Communications Act. Fi-
nally, the court rejected the limited offset policy,
finding that LEC's were not entitled to minimum
rates of return.
Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC
43 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC can lawfully relax the filing re-
quirements for nondominant common carriers by al-
lowing the nondominant carriers to file a range of
rates as opposed to fixed rates.
Holding:
The FCC lacks the authority to modify congres-
sionally mandated filing requirements.
Discussion:
The FCC has a history of relaxing the tariff-filing
requirements for nondominant common carriers.
However, courts generally find that the FCC has no
authority to modify Congress's intention that every
common carrier shall file tariffs with the FCC pur-
suant to the Communications Act of 1984.
In this instance, the FCC proposed to adopt a pol-
icy allowing nondominant common carriers to file a
range of rates as opposed to fixed rates. AT&T and
three Bell Operating Companies alleged that such a
range tariff would violate section 203(a) of the Com-
munications Act.
The FCC offered two main arguments. One, sec-
tion 203(a)'s requirement that all charges must be
shown does not preclude the use of a range of rates
to show those charges. Two, section 203(b) allows
the FCC to modify requirements set out in the Act.
The court disagreed and found that section 203(a)
clearly requires the filing of all charges and not just
a range. The court reasoned that Congress would
have expressly included the range concept in the
wording of section 203(a), since such language was
used in other parts of the Act. Rejecting the FCC's
section 203(b) argument, the court cited MCI v.
AT&T, where the Supreme Court determined that
Congress granted the FCC only a very modest modi-
fication authority under section 203(b).
COPYRIGHT ISSUES
National Football League v. Play By Play S.B.
1995 WL 753840 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1995)
Issue:
Whether unauthorized interception and public ex-
hibition of a private satellite transmission of a Na-
tional Football League telecast violates the Copy-
right and Communications Acts.
Holding:
The unauthorized interception and broadcast of
the NFL telecast violated both the Copyright and
Communications Acts.
Discussion:
Several sports bars in the Houston area inter-
cepted satellite transmissions of NFL games and
broadcast them for patrons. The NFL claimed that
there were no legitimate means by which the bars
could have received the transmissions. The bars de-
nied the allegations but failed to present any specific
facts indicating a genuine issue for trial to overcome
a motion for summary judgment. The court found
that the NFL owns the copyright of the game, and
that the bars infringed that copyright and violated
the Copyright Act when they showed the game for
patrons. The court found that the bars also violated
the Communications Act by intercepting a private
satellite transmission without permission. The
NFL's motion for partial summary judgment was
granted.
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine
829 F. Supp. 543 (D. R.I. 1995)
Issue:
Whether Rhode Island law prohibiting off-prem-
ises advertising of alcoholic beverage prices of liquor
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ban violates the First
First Amendment the 6:00 a.m. to midnight ban is
set aside in favor of the 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m ban,




This case arose because of Rhode Island laws that
collectively prohibit the off-premises, advertising of
the prices at which liquor stores sell beer, wine, and
hard alcohol. Because the ban restricts commercial
speech, the court used the four-part standard set
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Under this
test, the court must considerwhether the commercial
speech describes a lawful activity and is not mislead-
ing. Then, whether the asserted governmental inter-
est is substantial. If the answer to these questions is
yes, the court must determine whether the restriction
actually advances the substantial governmental inter-
est, and whether the restriction is narrowly tailored.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the party
seeking to restrict protected speech.
The parties stipulated that the first two prongs of
the Central Hudson Test were met, thus the court
discusses only the last two. In doing so, the court
stated that there must be an immediate connection
between the restriction and the governmental inter-
est. In this case, the government would have to prove
that there is a direct correlation between the price
advertising ban and reduced consumption of alcohol.
The court found that the necessary correlation was
lacking. Furthermore, the price advertising ban was
found to be more extensive than necessary to serve
the asserted interest. Therefore, the ban violates the
First Amendment.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC
58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the channeling of indecent broadcasts to
the hours between midnight and 6:00 a.m. for com-
mercial stations, and 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. for
public stations that go off the air at or before mid-
night, as required by Section 16(a) of the Public
Telecommunications Act of 1992, violates the First
Amendment.
Holding:
The safe harbor restriction does not violate the
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the
restrictions set forth in the 1992 Telecommunications
Act on three grounds: (1) the statute and regulations
violate the First Amendment because they are not
narrowly tailored to promote the Government's sub-
stantial interest; (2) the restrictions are unconstitu-
tional because they discriminate between public and
commercial broadcasters; and (3) the FCC's defini-
tion of indecency is unconstitutionally vague.
First, Restrictions that affect protected speech sur-
vive First Amendment scrutiny if the Government's
interests are compelling and the restrictions are nar-
rowly tailored to actually advance those interests.
The court found that the interests in supporting pa-
rental supervision of children and concern for chil-
dren's well-being were compelling. Moreover, al-
though some adults will be affected by the ban, the
court determined that the restrictions were narrowly
tailored, especially because the affected adults have
other means to obtain desired entertainment.
Second, the court found that allowing public sta-
tions, that sign off the air at or before midnight, to
broadcast indecent material after 10:00 p.m was not
adequately explained in light of the more restrictive
midnight to 6:00 a.m. ban applied to commercial sta-
tions. Therefore, the court limited the ban to the pe-
riod of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. for all stations.
Lastly, the court found the vagueness challenge to
be meritless in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
Action for Children's Television v. FCC
59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC's practice of imposing forfeiture
for indecent material using enforcement methods in
47 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) and 504(c) are unconstitutional
restrictions on speech.
Holding:
The FCC's enforcement methods may have some
faults, however, appellants failed to demonstrate they
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were being applied unconstitutionally.
Discussion:
Indecent speech, protected by the First Amend-
ment, must only be regulated by the "least restrictive
means necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est." Appellants argued that the severe delay of
sometimes several years on the part of the FCC in
reaching a final decision on forfeiture deprives them
of the procedural safeguards necessary under the
First Amendment, specifically judicial review. The
court rejected the facial challenge to the procedures
because they found that they were capable of consti-
tutional application, specifically the procedure could
be complete within a much shorter time period.
As to whether the procedures as applied are con-
stitutional, the court found there was no "literal
prior restraint." Broadcasters are not penalized until
after a broadcast airs. Under Bantam Books, 372
U.S. 58 (1963), prior restraint can be found if the
practice would lead broadcasters to conform their
conduct to an unconstitutional standard. The court
found the FCC did not discourage judicial review of
its forfeitures and that it was following judicial
guidelines for determining indecency. The court left
open for review a case where FCC's prior decisions
prevent a broadcaster from broadcasting non-inde-
cent material.
Alliance For Community Media v. FCC
56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the FCC's orders pursuant to section 10
of the 1992 Cable Act addressing indecent and ob-
scene programming violates the First Amendment.
Holding:
Section 10 of the Cable Television Consumer Pro-
tection and Competition Act of 1992 and the FCC's
regulations pursuant to section 10 of the Act do not
violate the First Amendment.
Discussion:
In 1992, Congress revised the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984. Specifically, Section 10 of
the 1992 Act was added which made significant
changes to the existing system involving cable opera-
tors and indecent or obscene programming. In 1993,
the FCC issued regulations implementing section 10.
This case was originally heard in 1993 and re-
manded to the FCC on the grounds that sections
10(a) and 10(c) violated the First Amendment and
that section 10(b) as well as the FCC's regulations
posed "serious constitutional questions" which mer-
ited reconsideration. Subsequently, the full court va-
cated the panel's judgment. Here, on rehearing the
case "en bane," the court changed its course and up-
held section 10 as well as the regulations promul-
gated by the FCC.
The court found that the application of sections
10(a) and 10(c), and the corresponding regulations
promulgated by the FCC did not constitute state ac-
tion. The court's decision rested primarily on the de-
termination that these clauses gave operators edito-
rial control over programming as opposed to control
which established a "'sufficiently close nexus' be-
tween the government and cable operators."
The court further determined that the leased ac-
cess and PEG channels involved were not, for consti-
tutional purposes, public forums. The court noted
that these channels were not government owned.
Next, the court addressed section 10(b) of the Act.
First, the court addressed the issue of whether the
segregation and blocking requirements of 10(b) are
the least restrictive means of limiting the access of
children to indecent programming. After analyzing
the alternatives of restricting indecent programming
to late-night hours "safe harbor" and subscriber-ini-
tiated blocking, the court found that these require-
ments were indeed the least restrictive means of
achieving the government's compelling interest in the
protection of children. Second, the court addressed
the issue of whether section 10(b)'s segregation and
blocking requirements constituted speaker-based dis-
crimination by discriminating against programming
on leased access channels in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fifth Amendment as well as
the First Amendment. The court began its analysis
by noting that this provision made no changes to the
1984 Act which "petitioners tout as the epitome of
constitutionality." The court rejected this argument
and further noted that Congress, in addressing only
the most serious concerns regarding indecent pro-
gramming, acted well within its constitutional au-
thority and that Congress may have been restricted
from going further by the constitutional doctrines of
"narrow tailoring" and "least restrictive means."
Lastly, the court rejected petitioner's arguments
that allowing cable operators thirty days to comply
with a subscriber's request to unblock a channel
pursuant to section 10(b) was a prior restraint in vi-
olation of the First Amendment, and that section
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10(b) was unconstitutionally vague.
Clark v. Plummer
1995 WL 317015 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1995)
Issue:
Whether the telephone system available for use by
inmates at the Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita,
California violates the First Amendment, Due Pro-
cess, Equal Protection, or the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, or state law.
Holding:
In light of legitimate security interests and reason-
able restrictions upon inmate access to the telephone
system, the telephone system does not violate the
U.S. Constitution, the Federal Communications Act
of 1934, or state law.
Discussion:
The court found that the Plaintiff's First Amend-
ment claim failed because the restrictions on access
were reasonable in light of legitimate security inter-
ests. Further, Due Process would only be implicated
if the inmate's access to the courts were denied. This
was not the case here. There is no cognizable claim
under the Equal Protection Clause because inmates
and non-inmates are not similarly situated, and there
is a rational basis for different treatment. Moreover,
the court stated that even total denial of phone access
for convicted prisoners was not cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In addi-
tion, the Communications Act provides no relief for
Plaintiff because the restrictions are just and reason-
able in light of the penological justifications for lim-
iting access. Lastly, this court has no jurisdiction
over state law claims.
Destination Ventures, LTD. v. FCC
46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the 1991 Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act's ban on unsolicited commercial fax solicita-
tions violates the First Amendment.
Holding:
The 1991 Telephone Consumer Protection Act's
ban on unsolicited commercial fax solicitations meets
the reasonable fit test and therefore does not violate
the Constitution.
Discussion:
The court employed the reasonable fit test, where
regulation of commercial speech must directly ad-
vance a substantial governmental interest in a man-
ner that forms a reasonable fit with the interest. The
interest here was to prevent the shifting of advertis-
ing costs to consumers. Because plaintiffs did not dis-
pute Congressional findings that unsolicited commer-
cial fax solicitations were responsible for the bulk of
advertising cost shifting, and because the ban applied
to commercial solicitation by any organization, the
restriction was held as a reasonable means of achiev-
ing the goal of reducing cost shifting.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.
115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)
Issue:
Whether the Florida Bar's 30-day ban on targeted
direct-mail solicitation by lawyers to accident victims
and their relatives violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments as an unconstitutional suppression of
commercial speech.
Holding:
The Florida Bar rules are not violative of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Decision:
State imposed restrictions on commercial speech,
that are neither false nor misleading, are analyzed
with intermediate scrutiny under the three-part test
enunciated in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). First, the government must have a substan-
tial state interest that justifies the restriction. Second,
the restriction must advance that interest to a mate-
rial degree. Third, the regulation must be narrowly
tailored to serve the state's interest.
The Supreme Court held that the state has a sub-
stantial interest in protecting the privacy and tran-
quility of personal injury victims, and in safeguard-
ing the reputation of lawyers. Furthermore,
Florida's detailed empirical data on lawyer advertis-
ing was sufficient to establish that the ban would ad-
vance the state's interest in a direct and material
way. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that
less restrictive means were available and concluded




Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi-
sexual Group of Boston, Etc.
115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995)
Issue:
Whether Massachusetts law may require private
citizens, who organize a parade, to include groups
that espouse a message that organizers do not wish
to convey without violating the First Amendment.
Holding:
To require private citizens to admit a group of
parade marchers with views opposed to the or-
ganizers' views violates the First Amendment.
Discussion:
This case arose when the organizers of the annual
St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston refused to allow
the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group ("GLIB") to participate in the march. GLIB
claimed, and the State Supreme Court agreed, that
such a refusal violated the Massachusetts public ac-
commodations law. The organizers countered that
use of the public accommodations law to force the
inclusion of GLIB in the parade violated the or-
ganizers' First Amendment rights.
The Court held that a parade was inherently ex-
pressive and that individuals are granted autonomy
to control one's own speech. Therefore, the choice of
whether or not to express a particular viewpoint lies
beyond the government's power to control, and the
parade organizers are not required to include GLIB
in the march.
Moser v. FCC
46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether the 1991 Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act's ban on the use of a prerecorded voice to
deliver messages to residential lines violates the First
Amendment.
Holding:
The provision in the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1991 banning automated, prerecorded
calls to residential lines is content neutral. Congress
adequately demonstrated that such calls pose a threat
to residential privacy. The ban is narrowly tailored
to advance that interest, and leaves open ample alter-
native channels of communication. Thus, it does not
violate the First Amendment.
Discussion:
The nonprofit National Association of Telecom-
puter Operators ("NATO") challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Act's restrictions under the First
Amendment, alleging that the law created a content-
based restriction, not narrowly tailored to further a
substantial government interest. The court analyzed
the statute as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction. This standard allows the govern-
ment to impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech, provided that
the restrictions are justified without reference to the
content of the restricted speech, that they are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental in-
terest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication and information.
In this case, the court found that because the ban
does not distinguish between commercial and non-
commercial calls, it does not refer to content. More-
over, the significant governmental interest is the pro-
tection of residential privacy. Although the law
allows the FCC to exempt noncommercial calls from
the ban, underinclusiveness may be the basis of a
First Amendment violation only when a regulation
represents an attempt to give one side of a debatable
public question an advantage in expressing its views
to the public. This is not the result here, and the
restriction is congidered narrowly tailored. Lastly,
the Act leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication, including the use of taped messages
introduced by a live speaker or taped messages to
which consumers have consented.
Procter & Gamble Company v. Bankers Trust
Company
No. 95-4078, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3817 (6th Cir.
Mar. 5, 1996).
Issue:
Whether the First Amendment principal that the
press shall be free from prior restraints can be set
aside when a federal court finds that the secrecy of
material placed under seal by stipulation of the par-
ties is threatened.
Holding:
The secret litigation filings do not fall into that the
extremely narrow class of cases where dissemination
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of information would be so detrimental to fundamen-
tal government interests that prior restraints are
justified.
Discussion:
This appeal resulted/when the district court issued
an injunction prohibiting Business Week magazine
from publishing an article disclosing the contents of
documents filed under a seal of secrecy. The court
held that the requisite extreme circumstances al-
lowing a prior restraint were nonexistent in this case
because the documents in question were merely stan-
dard litigation filings and protection of vanity or
commercial self-interest do not come close to meeting
the very narrow exception to the rule that protects
the press.
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)
Issue:
Whether a state university's refusal to fund a stu-
dent publication solely on the basis of its religious
editorial viewpoint violates the First Amendment.
Holding:
Refusal to fund the student publication violates
the First Amendment.
Discussion:
The University of'Virginia ("University"),which
authorizes payment for outside printing contractors
for student publications, refused to authorize pay-
ment for Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at
the University of Virginia ("Wide Awake") solely
based on the religiotis viewpoints expressed in the
publication.
Content discrimination may be permissible in a
limited public forum such as a university if the dis-
crimination preserves' the limited forum's purposes,
but discrimination based on a speaker's viewpoint is
presumed impermissible. Thus, the Court held that
the University impermissibly discriminated against
Wide Awake.
Further, the court rejected the University's argu-
ment that scarce economic resources justified dis-
crimination, stating that rationing of resources must
be based upon a neutral principle and not upon
viewpoint.
In addition, the Court in discussing the impor-
tance of a governmental program's neutrality to-
wards religion, noted that there was no suggestion
that the University created the program at issue to
advance religion. Further, the court dispelled con-
cerns that the publication's religious orientation
would be attributed to the University by holding that
it was not a plausible fear and that there was no real
likelihood that the speech in question was being ei-
ther endorsed or coerced by the state (since the Uni-
versity of Virginia is a state university). Thus, the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does
not require the University to deny eligibility to stu-
dent publications because of their viewpoint.
Russell v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc.
1995 WL 330920 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1995)
Issue:
Whether a PrimeTime Live television news pro-
gram's secret recording of conversations later broad-
cast violated wiretap laws, presented the plaintiff in
a false light, or gave rise to an intrusion upon seclu-
sion claim.
Holding:
While the television program was within its rights
to record the conversations and did not invade the
privacy of the plaintiff; the false light claim survives
against the defendant American Broadcasting Co.,
Inc.
Discussion:
An American Broadcasting Co., Inc. ("ABC")
employee wore a hidden camera and tape recorder to
gather information for a news program about sanita-
tion problems in the commercial fish industry. Parts
of two conversations with a store manager, plaintiff
Marilyn Russell, were aired as part of a PrimeTime
Live story.
The court found that the films and recordings did
not violate the Wire and Electronic Communications
Interception and Interception of Oral Communica-
tions Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (West Supp.
1995), nor did they invade Russell's privacy, because
the ABC employee had a right to record conversa-
tions to which she was a party and because Russell
had no expectation of privacy in those conversations.
The court found that a similar claim under the Illi-
nois Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILCS §4/14 (West
1993 & Supp. 1995), failed for the same reasons.
However, the court found that Russell may go for-
ward on her false light invasion of privacy claim
against ABC. Although the court found that portions
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of Russell's conversations used in the program could
be understood as innocent if heard in isolation, the
words imply wrongdoing in the context of a program
on sanitation problems in the commercial fish
industry.
Russell also claimed that the secret -recordings in-
trude upon a seclusion claim. The court stated that
Russell was harmed, if at all, by the publication of
the conversations, not the recordings themselves. The
court noted that intrusion upon seclusion is not a
cause of action in Illinois, but even if it were, it does
not go to publication and therefore would not be a
valid claim in this case. :
Southern New England Telephone Co. v. United
States
886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 1995)
Issue:
Whether a provision of the 1984 Cable Act,
prohibiting a telephone local exchange carrier from
offering video programming directly to subscribers in
its telephone service area, violates the carrier's First
Amendment rights.
Holding:
The court used intermediate scrutiny to hold that
while the restriction was content neutral, the provi-
sion was not narrowly tailored to serve the govern-
ment interest and therefore violated the local ex-
change carrier's First Amendment rights.
Discussion:
Section 533 of the 1984 Cable Act made it unlaw-
ful for LECs or their affiliates to provide video pro-
gramming to subscribers in their telephone service
areas. These cross-ownership rules were designed to
prevent local media monopolies, while encouraging
diverse ownership of carriers.
Southern New England Telephone Co., the local
exchange carrier ("LEC") -for most of Connecticut,
sought authorization from the FCC to carry video
programming to parts of Hartford and Fairfield
counties. When the FCC refused authorization,
Southern New England filed this suit claiming that
the cross-ownership restrictions violated their First
Amendment rights.
The government argued.'that the cross-ownership
restrictions should be subject to a minimal level of
scrutiny because they indirectly impact speech. The
district court disagreed, noting that intermediate
scrutiny was more appropriate because the restric-
tions impose a burden on protected First Amend-
ment activities. Under the intermediate standard, a
government restriction on speech will be upheld if
the restriction is content neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leaves
open ample alternative channels for communication
of information.
Applying this standard, the court held that the
cross-ownership restrictions were not narrowly tai-
lored to prevent anticompetitive behavior, since there
were numerous and obvious' less-burdensome alter-
natives. Furthermore, there was nothing in the rec-
ord to indicate that the cross-ownership restrictions
actually served the goals they were intended to ad-
dress. Accordingly, the court granted Southern New
England Telephone Co.'s motion for summary
judgment.
Van Bergen v. State of Minnesota
59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995)
Issue:
Whether a statute regulating the use of telephone
automatic dialing-announcing devices violates the
freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment.
Holding:
The statute is a valid time, place or manner re-
striction of protected speech under the First
Amendment.
Discussion:
The government may impose reasonable restric-
tions on the time, place or manner of protected
speech if those restrictions are justified without refer-
ence to the speech's content. The court in this case
found that a statute regulating telephone automatic
dialing/announcing devices ("ADAD"), program-
med to automatically dial telephone numbers and de-
liver a recorded message when the telephone is an-
swered, is content-neutral.
Under the Minnesota statute, all callers, regard-
less of the content of their messages, must have the
consent of a telephone line subscriber - either ac-
tual consent or implied consent based upon an ex-
isting business or social relationship - before they
may deliver an ADAD message. The statute also re-
quires that ADAD calls be made only between 9
a.m. and 9 p.m., regardless of their content. The
court found the statute content-neutral because it
limits the manner and time in which ADAD calls
are made, not the content of the calls.
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The court further determined that the telephone
network is a private entity because, even though it is
heavily regulated, it is privately created, owned and
operated, and primarily used for private communica-
tion between two parties. Because the telephone sys-
tem is a private channel of communication rather
than a public forum, a statute regulating it is not
subject to public forum analysis under the First
Amendment. Instead, the court analyzed the statute
as a time, place or manner restriction under the in-
termediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-
neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden
on speech. Under this analysis, a statute must be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and leave open ample alternative channels
for communication. The potential intrusiveness of
ADAD calls on the home and workplace and the
lack of opportunity for a receiver to indicate during
the call whether he wants to receive any further calls
creates a significant government interest in limiting
them, according to the court. The court also found
that the statute is narrowly tailored to reach that in-
terest because it allows ADAD calls with the re-
ceiver's consent. The court cited live telephone calls,
street corner leafletting, and bulk mailings as some
of the alternative channels available to communicate
the same information contained in an ADAD call,
satisfying the final prong of the intermediate scrutiny
test.
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